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I. INTRODUCTION 
“As goes Ohio, so goes the nation.”1 In recent years, significant attention has 
been paid to elections in Ohio. In 2004, the eyes of the world focused on Ohio as the 
presidential election nearly went to a recount reminiscent of Florida in 2000 because 
Ohio was unable to declare a winner. In 2008, not long after Ohio was called for 
then Senator Barack Obama, the television commentators recognized that Senator 
                                                                                                                                         
 1 The original phrase is in reference to another state: “As Maine goes, so goes the 
country.” ROBERT W. SPEEL, CHANGING PATTERNS OF VOTING IN THE NORTHERN UNITED 
STATES: ELECTORAL REALIGNMENT 1952-1996, at 19 (1998) (citing HENRY F. WOODS, 
AMERICAN SAYINGS 109 (1945)). Until 1960, Maine held its elections in September, two 
months before the rest of the country. Ken Rudin, The Significance of the V.P. Pick, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM (July 14, 2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/ 
campaigns/junkie/archive/junkie071400.htm. Therefore, the phrase only referred to the fact 
that Maine voted months before anyone else. Id. The Ohio-centric turn of phrase seems to 
have begun appearing during the 2004 presidential election as the outcome of that national 
election was completely dependent on the outcome of Ohio’s election. As Ohio has been a 
perpetual presidential swing state since the 2004 election, the phrase stuck. See generally Kate 
Snow, As Ohio Goes, So Goes the Nation . . . Again, ABC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2007), http:// 
abcnews.go.com/WN/Vote2008/story?id=3826822; As Ohio Goes, So Goes The Nation. 
Sometimes., WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2008/03/05/AR2008030503510.html; Zak Lutz, So Goes Ohio, So Goes the 
Nation, HARVARD UNIV. INSTITUTE OF POLITICS (2012), http://www.iop.harvard.edu/so-goes-
ohio-so-goes-nation. 
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John McCain would not be able to overcome Senator Obama’s Electoral College 
lead, thereby projecting Senator Obama would win the presidency.2 This pattern 
repeated in 2012 where, within seconds of calling Ohio for President Obama, the 
media declared he had won re-election. 3 
In all three elections, the country was able to avoid an electoral meltdown in part 
because Ohio was able to count votes in short order. However, each of the elections 
demonstrated to the world the susceptibility of elections that hinge upon the 
mechanisms and methods in place to determine what cast ballots are to be counted. 
Since the 2000 election, the mechanism of elections has been subject to review by 
scholars, lawmakers, advocates, and in many cases federal courts. The continual 
change in and review of election systems have not overcome the reality that elections 
systems, including Ohio’s system, could not weather a close or controversial election 
without delay, litigation, or doubt as to the result.4 If such a conflict would arise, the 
actions taken in polling places across the state could be critical in determining a 
victor within the state and possibly the nation. 
Ohio, like many states, has responded to this circumstance with an incredibly 
technical and rule driven approach to election administration.5 This approach to 
elections administration is deficient for two primary reasons: (1) it refuses to accept 
that mistakes happen, and (2) the only mistakes that are subject to scrutiny are those 
that leave a sufficient paper trail that they could be subject to litigation or post-
election scrutiny. This Article presents an analysis of Election Day error in Ohio's 
2012 general election through a discussion of the materiality principle, compliance 
standards, and the Democracy Canon, and suggests that a hybrid approach to 
election administration is necessary for Ohio’s General Assembly and election 
administrators at every level to better identify those mistakes and incorporate real-
time mistake remedies into Election Day procedures. Ultimately, the human factor of 
elections should be recognized as an opportunity for better voter understanding and 
participation rather than a barrier in the pursuit of a perfect Election Day. 
                                                                                                                                         
 2 Joe Scarborough, live on MSNBC after calling Ohio for Obama, stated, “[W]e don’t 
want to call it. There are still people on the West Coast that have to vote, but I just don’t see 
any pathway . . . [for McCain victory].” MSNBC television broadcast Nov. 4, 2008. 
 3 Brett Baier, after declaring Ohio for President Obama, said, “That’s the presidency . . . 
essentially, Barack Obama is re-elected.” FOX News television broadcast Nov. 6, 2012. 
Rachel Maddow on MSNBC said, “[W]e have just learned that in the state of Ohio, NBC 
News has projected that President Obama has won the state of Ohio. President Obama has 
been re-elected for a second term.” MSNBC television broadcast Nov. 6, 2012. Wolf Blitzer 
said, “CNN projects that Barack Obama will be re-elected President of the United States. He 
will remain in the White House for another four years because we project that he will carry the 
state of Ohio. By carrying Ohio, he wins the election for President of the United States.” CNN 
television broadcast Nov. 6, 2012.  
 4 Edward B. Foley, Numbers Show Ohio at Unique Risk of Disputed Presidential Votes, 
ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Dec. 17, 2012), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/ 
index.php?ID=10289. 
 5 For example, the Ohio Secretary of State provides training and manuals. See Elections 
& Voting, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/elections 
officials/electOffPubs/general.aspx (including, for example, a 998 page “Election Official 
Manual” and 58 directives issued in 2012).  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. A review of the Materiality Principle, compliance standards, and Democracy 
Canon are critical in order to propose an election system for Ohio in the wake of the 
November 2012 election that accounts for the Election Day experience. 
A review of literature on remediation of election error uncovers scholarship 
primarily addressing issues after elections and how to reduce the frequency and costs 
associated with recounts and litigation.6 In order to address and accommodate the 
issues of election error and constructing a fairer system of addressing Election Day 
error, we must examine the concepts guiding election error generally and apply them 
to issues at the point of voting. 
1. Materiality Principle 
In Resolving Election Error: Dynamic Assessment of Materiality, Justin Levitt 
argues that “materiality” to voter eligibility should be the standard when determining 
whether a ballot should be rejected because of error.7 The author notes two parts to 
materiality: (1) significant mistake to a requirement that is irrelevant to determining 
voter eligibility is not material, and (2) irrelevant mistake to provision necessary to 
determine voter eligibility is not material.8 Materiality is dynamic: what is material 
today may be immaterial tomorrow, and what is immaterial today may be material 
tomorrow.9 Under the materiality standard, votes should be counted so long as no 
reasonable decision maker would have a substantial question about either the voter's 
eligibility or the voter's ballot preference.10 The Materiality Principle does not 
demand incremental procedures “to seek information bearing on the validity of a 
vote; it merely changes the standard by which votes are evaluated when there is 
cause to undertake an evaluation.”11 Levitt argues that this standard is no more 
subject to substantial bias than any other standard that has been proposed or is in 
use.12 Levitt notes both the legislatively created “election regulations are to be 
constructed liberally in favor of the voter” and the judicial “substantial compliance” 
                                                                                                                                         
 6 One exception to this general standard relates to ballot design. Election officials have 
shown a willingness to recognize and mitigate mistakes caused by how voters interact with a 
ballot. See Mary Beth Beazley, Ballot Design as Fail-Safe: An Ounce of Rotation is Worth a 
Pound of Litigation, 12 ELECTION L.J. 18 (2013). Attention to ballot design concerns is similar 
to pre- and post-election challenges in the existence of a clear evidentiary record and items 
that can be assessed and modified outside of the strict time limitations of Election Day.  
 7 Justin Levitt, Resolving Election Error: The Dynamic Assessment of Materiality, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 103 (2012). 
 8 See id. at 108.  
 9 Id. at 113. 
 10 Id. at 123. 
 11 Id. at 123-24. 
 12 Id. at 138. 
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approach as flexible standards that leave similar option for bias as the Materiality 
Principle.13 
2. Compliance Standards 
Edward Foley’s How Fair Can Be Faster: the Lessons of Coleman v. Franken, 
examines the concept of fair elections and vote counting through the lens of the 2008 
Minnesota Senate election and recount.14 This Article proposes a model calendar for 
the duration of seven weeks for major election recounts, and describes the creation 
and implementation of an impartial tribunal.15 It also argues that a fair 
tribunal/process is more important than having ideal rules for vote-counting.16 Foley 
describes three vote-counting regimes, noting that constructive compliance seems 
intuitively superior to a harsh strict compliance regime.17 First he discusses the strict 
compliance standard under which only ballots free from error and cast in strict 
compliance with election laws can be counted, even when the deviation from law is 
due to official error.18 The second standard Foley explains is substantial compliance, 
wherein ballots with some errors can be counted, even if the errors are caused by the 
voter, because the ballot is in substantial compliance with the law.19 Finally, he 
discusses the concept of constructive compliance, where a voter constructively 
complies with the law when she does everything she can to comply with the election 
laws, but an election official makes an error causing the ballot to no longer comply 
with the law.20 These ballots may be counted, but ballots with voter-caused error 
may not.21 Foley concludes that because state election laws and relevant case law are 
rarely clear on the choice between vote-counting regimes, an impartial tribunal to 
select the proper vote counting doctrine is more important to fairness than picking 
the ‘correct’ vote-counting method.22 
3. The Democracy Canon and Alternatives 
Richard Hasen, in The Democracy Canon, describes the Democracy Canon as a 
substantive canon of statutory interpretation that says ambiguous election laws 
should be liberally construed in favor of the voter.23 The Canon has a longstanding 
                                                                                                                                         
 13 Id. at 99. In Ohio, this balancing approach is seen by both a general statement that a 
vote should count if intent is clear and in rulings in the NEOCH v. Husted case, discussed in 
detail below through use of a fault-based analysis. 
 14 Edward Foley, How Fair Can Be Faster: the Lessons of Coleman v. Franken, 10 
ELECTION L.J. 187 (2011), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/documents/hfcbf. 
pdf. 
 15 Id. at 187, 198-99. 
 16 Id. at 216. 
 17 Id. at 217. 
 18 Id.  
 19 Id.  
 20 Id. at 218. 
 21 Id.  
 22 Id. at 219. 
 23 Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 77 (2009). 
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history in state courts when deciding vote counting cases in which ballots are 
disputed due to minor voter error, poll worker error, or a disputed reading of a 
statute.24 Hasen shows that it applies when the election law is ambiguous, but 
probably does not apply when the language of the statute is clear.25 The Democracy 
Canon is different from other substantive canons because it helps enforce the right to 
vote and, due to the political salience of elections policy, legislatures can overrule 
what they see to be incorrect decisions of the courts by clarifying the law via 
legislation (although this is only helpful to subsequent elections).26 Hasen argues that 
the Democracy Canon is especially vulnerable to politicization, but consistent 
application and attempts to educate the public about the history of the canon should 
reduce the extent to which use of this canon is seen as a partisan move.27 
The Democracy Canon has been subjected to significant critique. Christopher 
Elmendorf's Refining the Democracy Canon, is a direct response and critique of 
Hasen’s The Democracy Canon. Elmendorf is skeptical of the Democracy Canon 
because of costs that may be associated with it.28 These costs are: (1) an increase in 
the “partisan gap” in judicial rulings in election cases, undermining public 
confidence in the neutrality of courts and election results, (2) a potential for 
undermining incentives for bipartisan compromise on election issues, as thumbing 
the scale in favor of one position could make the other side fight for tighter language 
or prevent the legislation from passing, and (3) the possibility of displacing 
important, non-election matters from the legislature’s agenda in order to correct a 
judicial interpretation that does not comport with the legislature’s intention.29  
Elemendorf proposes three other canons of interpretation that could be used in 
place of the Democracy Canon: the Effective Accountability Canon, the Carrington 
Canon, and the Neutrality Canon.30 An Effective Accountability Canon would 
encompass a norm that says an election law, or suite of election laws, is 
unconstitutional if there are practicable alternatives that would result in substantially 
more effective accountability to the normative electorate at reasonable cost.31 
Elmendorf argues this norm is embodied in the 17th Amendment32 and the 
                                                                                                                                         
 24 Id. at 76-80. 
 25 Id. at 88. 
 26 Id. at 97-102. 
 27 Id. at 106. 
 28 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1051, 
1056 (2010). 
 29 Id. at 1057. 
 30 Id. at 1055-56. 
 31 Id. at 1076-77. 
 32 The 17th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, 
elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The 
electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most 
numerous branch of the state legislatures. When vacancies happen in the 
representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall 
issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, that the legislature of any State 
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Guarantee Clause33 of the U.S. Constitution and that under this standard of 
interpretation, ambiguities in statutes should be resolved in favor of a reading that 
helps the result of an election capture what the public “wanted” the result to be.34 
The Carrington Canon35 would interpret election statutes narrowly when they are 
passed on party lines and would remove or reverse the normal presumption of 
deference to administrative agencies if the agency is partisan in structure.36 Finally, 
the Neutrality Canon would construe election laws to avoid finding a private right of 
action near the apex of an election cycle, convert vaguely worded statutory standards 
into clear judicially constructed doctrines, presume that agencies charged with 
administration of elections have authority to issue rules with the force of law, and 
treat a bipartisan or difference-splitting interpretation as presumptively correct.37 
4. Partisanship and Decentralization of Election Administration 
The idea that rampant partisanship and a decentralization of election 
administration have only exacerbated instances of and ineffective responses to 
election error is discussed extensively in relevant literature.38 In Getting From Here 
to There in Election Reform, Heather Gerken begins by describing numerous 
instances of electoral error, from erroneously discarded ballots and long voting lines 
to poorly trained poll workers and voting machine breakdowns. She also discusses 
why electoral reform should be easy: there is a consensus that a problem exists, 
numerous possible solutions have been proposed by legislators and academics, 
                                                                                                                                         
may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people 
fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. This amendment shall not 
be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it 
becomes valid as part of the Constitution. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. For Elmendorf, the requirement of direct election by the people 
requires a canon of interpretation that prioritizes and gives deference to the intent of the voting 
public. See Elmendorf, supra note 28, at 1077-78. 
 33 Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution states: “The United States shall guarantee 
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them 
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the 
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
Elmendorf specifically argues that the Founding-era ideas of republican government 
specifically references a no monarchial government through a “filtered-majoritarian system of 
rule—one that provides for popular accountability while checking the citizenry’s passions and 
naked self-interest.” Elmendorf, supra note 28, at 1078. 
 34 Elmendorf, supra note 28, at 1077-84. 
 35 The Canon is named after the Supreme Court case Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 
(1965). In Carrington, the Court held that denying someone access to the ballot based purely 
upon the way they may vote is unconstitutional. Id. at 97. 
 36 Elmendorf, supra note 28, at 1095-97. 
 37 Id. at 1098-104. 
 38 Ohio is not immune to this trend. One of several examples from recent years was the 
passage and later repeal of H.B. 194 (and the repealing act S.B. 224) during the 129th General 
Assembly. See David Eggert, House Likely to Kill Elections Bill Targeted by Referendum, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/04/ 
25/house-likely-to-kill-elections-bill-targeted-by-referendum.html. 
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elections are a salient and important issue, and several “crises” (namely Florida in 
2000 and Ohio in 2004) that elevated election problems to national prominence have 
occurred.39 However, Gerken notes that despite this environment ripe for reform, 
little has been done because of partisan and decentralized control and administration 
of elections.40 To overcome partisanship and localism, she suggests the creation and 
design of a Democracy Index, similar to the way US News and World Report ranks 
universities and colleges.41 The Democracy Index would include data on a number of 
election issues: how many ballots were discarded, how long did voters wait in line, 
how common were machine breakdowns, and others.42 This data-driven ranking 
would enable states to see where they stack up and undertake reform (because no 
one wants to be at the bottom), thus reducing impact of localism.43 The Index would 
also enable voters to gauge the job the election officials in their state (including the 
Secretary of State) are doing—something that is very difficult for most voters 
without some sort of heuristic measure—thus reducing impact of partisan self-
interest.44 To some degree The Pew Charitable Trusts has implemented an index 
similar to what Gerken proposes. Their Election Performance Index measures states 
on 17 indicators to create an overall score; relevant to this Article, the indicators do 
not attempt to measure mistake, but some indicators capture the result of mistakes 
such as provisional ballots rejected, voting wait time, and disability- or illness- 
related voting problems.45  
Richard Hasen also addresses the consequences of partisanship and decentralized 
elections administration in Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. 
Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown. Due to hyper-partisanship, 
decentralized election administration with patchwork application of rules, 
administrator incompetence, technological advances, and voter error, the possibility 
of “electoral meltdown”46 is becoming increasingly more likely.47 Hasen proposes 
                                                                                                                                         
 39 Heather K. Gerken, Getting From Here to There in Election Reform, 34 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 33, 36-38 (2009). 
 40 Id. at 38-39. Though neither squarely within Gerken’s analysis nor the scope of this 
Article, it is imperative to note that before any sustained reform could be attempted, political 
leaders need to reach some agreement as to the appropriate role of government in relation to 
voting. For the record, it is the position of the authors that government at every level has an 
obligation to not only regulate the franchise, but to encourage, promote, and protect exercise 
of the right to vote at every level.  
 41 Id. at 39-40. 
 42 Id. at 40. 
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. at 44. 
 45 Elections Performance Index, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, http://www.pewstates.org/ 
research/data-visualizations/measuring-state-elections-performance-85899446194. Ohio 
ranked 40th at 64% for 2010 (the most recent data available). Id. 
 46 Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 938 (2005). 
Hasen refers to the 2000 presidential election as the “first presidential meltdown” in recent 
memory. Even though he declines to specifically define what constitutes an “electoral 
meltdown,” his comments seem to suggest that a meltdown is characterized by vote totals 
within the margin of litigation, thereby sending the election into court and leaving the public 
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three reforms to reduce the risk of electoral meltdown: (1) registration reforms 
including universal registration coupled with a national voter identification program, 
(2) transition to nonpartisan election administration with nonpartisan chief elections 
officers, and (3) more court willingness to entertain pre-election challenges and less 
willingness with post-election litigation.48 Hasen's registration reform proposal 
attempts to combine Republican policies (voter ID card with name, signature, 
photograph, and fingerprints) with Democrat policies (universal registration).49 This 
proposed reform suggests the federal government should be responsible for 
implementing the voter identification cards and universal registration.50 Hasen also 
proposes creating nonpartisan chief elections officers, appointed by the governor and 
confirmed by a supermajority of the legislature.51 In order to ensure insulation from 
political pressure, the officer would have a single long term, be removable only by 
impeachment and be guaranteed sufficient funding in the state constitution.52 Lastly, 
Hasen argues courts should be reluctant to hear post-election challenges when the 
issue was foreseeable prior to the election, and should be more open to pre-election 
challenges.53 
B. A rigidly technical approach to election administration and mistake is 
unnecessary since the Anderson-Burdick framework, as it has been applied within 
the 6th Circuit, supports flexibility in election administration.  
In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 
U.S. 428 (1992), the Court developed a balancing test which provides needed 
guidance and flexibility for evaluation of election regulation.54 Any regulatory 
burden on the right to vote must be justified by balancing state interest. The 
balancing test established in Anderson requires a court to consider the nature and 
size of the alleged injury, identify and evaluate the state interests in the regulation, 
and determine “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the 
plaintiff’s rights.”55 Applying this standard in Burdick, this Court found “the 
                                                                                                                                         
with an indeterminate outcome for a period of time. These actions severely undermine the 
public trust in election integrity, which create an “electoral meltdown” in a democratic 
society. 
 47 Id. at 944. 
 48 Id. at 945-46. 
 49 Id. at 969-72. 
 50 Id. at 972-73. 
 51 Id. at 983-85. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Id. at 991. 
 54 The following analysis of Anderson and Burdick is adapted from and expands on the 
amicus brief in favor of respondents filed by author Kearney and drafted in part by authors 
Parikh and Sanders, on behalf of the Senate Minority Caucus in Husted v. Obama for 
America, 133 S. Ct. 497 (2012).  
 55 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
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rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon 
the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens . . . rights.”56  
There is no question that voting is a fundamental right. Any restriction on the 
exercise of the franchise of voting “must be justified by relevant and legitimate state 
interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.’”57 States have an obligation 
to regulate elections and voting to facilitate the democratic process. “States may not 
casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some remote 
administrative benefit to the State.”58 As a result, states have developed complex 
election regulations and codes. The Court has acknowledged that  
[e]ach provision of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and 
qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the 
voting process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the 
individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political 
ends. Nevertheless, the State’s important regulatory interests are generally 
sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.59  
The Anderson/Burdick standard was relied upon and ultimately strengthened 
during litigation in the fall of 2012. It has been proposed, particularly by Richard 
Hasen that the use of Bush v. Gore in combination with the existing balancing 
framework “reflect a broader change in the circuit’s view of election administration 
cases and the precedential value of the controversial 2000 Supreme Court Case.”60 
This same type of voter focused balancing could be incredibly effective in 
approaching mistake. 
As with all balanced based standards, the Anderson/Burdick balancing standard is 
flexible. Through not prescribing any one requirement, it supports a range of options 
for states for the management of the electoral process. The Anderson/Burdick 
standard is also compatible with the Democracy Canon and the Materiality Principle. 
The Democracy Canon supports facilitating voting, emphasizing the right to vote 
when weighing regulation against it. The Materiality Principle especially through its 
dynamic response to errors provides a means of regulating with the least possible 
restriction on the right to vote.61 It rejects an overly technical approach, also 
embodied in the materiality principle, to election administration to the extent that 
such an approach unduly burdens voters compared to the state interest. Although it 
has not typically been applied in such a manner, the standard would permit an 
election administration mechanism that, in order to minimize a burden on the voter, 
permitted flexibility and avoided a search for perfection. Such flexibility was 
                                                                                                                                         
 56 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).  
 57 Crawford v Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (quoting Norman v. 
Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)).  
 58 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (internal citations omitted).  
 59 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.  
 60 Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of 
Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865, 1893 (2012). 
 61 In this respect the materiality principle is similar to Foley’s substantial compliance 
standard balancing regulatory need versus a human evaluation of whether a vote “should” 
count. 
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embraced as a tool to fight discrimination, such as through the Civil Rights Act it 
became unlawful to deny the right to vote in a federal election due to an immaterial 
mistake.62 This standard could be utilized as a mechanism to establish Election Day 
procedures that do not rely solely on setting out the means of holding elections, but 
make an affirmative statement that the purpose of elections is to record and reflect 
the will of the voters. 
C. Past litigation reveals a clear record of mistakes on Election Day, which 
inconsistently affect ballot inclusion. 
Evidence from past litigation demonstrates that issues at the polls exist and have 
persisted from previous elections. A review of pleadings from election related 
litigation63 shows 10 discreet types of error that have existed in Ohio election 
administration and for which there is no evidence to demonstrate the absence of 
these errors in the November 2012 election.64 The 10 types of error are: (1) general 
poll worker error; (2) right location-wrong precinct error; (3) failure to record 
information; (4) failure to make accommodation for disabilities or health problems; 
(5) failure to direct voters at all; (6) failure to instruct voters properly on how to 
complete a ballot; (7) failure to correctly handle properly completed ballots; (8) 
general voter error; (9) error in poll workers’ materials; and (10) errors in preparing 
election materials. 
1. General Poll Worker Error 
In the March 2012 Primary Election, there was evidence of general poll worker 
error. According to the minutes of the Butler County Board of Elections, poll worker 
training was one of the issues:  
The problems we saw on Election Day with our Provisional table were 
due to poll workers not being adequately trained on processing 
Provisional Voters on the Electronic Poll Books. . . . The suggestion was 
made to place an additional person at the Provisional Table to guide 
voters.65  
                                                                                                                                         
 62  
(2) No person acting under color of law shall— 
(B) deny the right of any individual to vote in any Federal election because of an error 
or omission on any record or paper relating to any application, registration, or other 
act requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material in determining whether 
such individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election . . . . 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec. 101, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 63 See, e.g., Northeast Ohio Coalition for Homeless (NEOCH) v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 
(6th Cir. 2012); Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1 (SEIU) v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 
2012); Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 64 Id.   
 65 Butler County Board of Elections Board Meeting Minutes from Mar. 21, 2012, at 
PageID No. 8738, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, 
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsA-M.pdf, at 
101. 
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In Franklin County in 2010, the Board recognized that given the structure of the 
administration of the elections on a poll location level, there were significant and 
pervasive errors undoubtedly due to poll worker error.66 Even worse, after the March 
2012 primary election in Trumbull County, the Board rejected all wrong precinct 
ballots, even though the Board noted that these errors were caused by poll workers.67  
These errors were nothing new. In the November 2006 election, Dora Rose, the 
organizer of voter protection in Cuyahoga County for the Democratic Party, 
observed the vote count at the Cuyahoga County Board of Election.68 She reported 
that provisional ballots with no birth dates were put into a rejected pile, ballots 
without addresses were put into a rejected pile, there were written instructions for 
workers to eliminate the 10 day return recourse for voters who could not remember 
the last four digits of their social security number, and no ballots were marked for a 
10-day hold—all in violation of Ohio election law.69 In 2008, the Scioto County 
Board of Elections “remade” 21 provisional ballots that were completed incorrectly 
due to poll worker error.70 In 2010 in Hocking County, the Board of Elections 
acknowledged that some voters were given the wrong ballot because of poll worker 
error.71 Despite efforts to train poll workers, errors continued to occur in the election 
process in Montgomery County. The Director of the Board of Elections stated that 
“even with training our pollworkers we have had many mistakes on Election Day 
with the provisional votes.”72 
                                                                                                                                         
 66 “[W]here there’s a single table and a single set of poll workers assigned to the task of 
provisional ballots for all the precincts in a location, it would be pretty difficult in this county 
to conceive of a situation where it would be a voter error.” Franklin County Board of 
Elections Special Meeting Transcript from Nov. 19, 2010, at PageID No. 8812, NEOCH v. 
Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at http://moritzlaw.osu. 
edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 20. 
 67 Trumbull County Board of Elections Board Meeting Minutes from Mar. 16, 2012, at 
PageID No. 9022, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, 
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsAA-MM.pdf, 
at 1. 
 68 Declaration of Dora Rose, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-
cv-00896, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/NEOCH 
%20Motion%20to%20Enforce%20Consent%20Order%20Exhibit%20D.pdf. 
 69 Id.  
 70 Scioto County Board of Elections Meeting Minutes from Nov. 4, 2008, at PageID No. 
8959, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsAA-MM.pdf, at 26. 
 71 Hocking County Board of Elections Meeting Minutes from Nov. 18, 2010, at PageID 
No. 8916-17, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available 
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 119-20. 
 72 Reply Declaration of Cathrine J. Harshman, at PageID No. 10506, NEOCH v. Husted, 
696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/ 
electionlaw/litigation/documents/DeclarationofCathrineJHarshman_000.pdf, at 7 (quoting 
Montgomery County Board of Elections Meeting Minutes from Nov. 1, 2010). 
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2. Right Location, Wrong Precinct 
One of the most prominent issues at the polls is the right location-wrong precinct 
problem. The problem can have many different causes, but some locations noticed 
significant issues due to poor staffing. During the 2010 election in Franklin County, 
Board of Elections staff explained that in at least one multi-precinct location, there 
“is a single table and a single set of poll workers assigned to the task of provisional 
ballots for all the precincts in a location [and] it would be pretty difficult in this 
county to conceive of a situation where it would be a voter error.”73 Because there is 
only one poll worker for provisional ballots, if a provisional ballot is cast in the 
wrong precinct, then the poll worker is almost certainly blameworthy. In Hamilton 
County during the March 2012 election, a ballot contained a conflict in the voter’s 
address. However, one of the addresses was actually the poll worker’s address, and 
the address was handwritten in another color of ink. Despite this strong indication of 
poll worker error, the Board refused to find that there was poll worker error and the 
ballot was not counted.74 In 2008 in Franklin County, a member of the Board of 
Elections described a specific instance of poll worker75 error that he observed, when 
a poll worker told the voter to go to the wrong precinct: 
I saw a woman that was in the right precinct but her driver’s license had a 
different address on it, and they told her to go to another precinct. And 
she went to the other precinct, and when she went to the other precinct 
they had her in the books there, but she said, I don’t live here. And so they 
said, well, you can vote here. And then she was smart enough to come 
back to the precinct that she was at, but had she not come back, she would 
have voted in the wrong precinct, and being directed to vote in the wrong 
precinct by our poll workers. So I see where this would be a situation that 
we ought to at least take into consideration.76 
These right location-wrong precinct problems are legion, and have become even 
more common through consolidation of polling locations in recent years. In March 
2012, the Ross County Board of Elections voted to reject three provisional ballots 
that were cast in the correct location, but the wrong precinct due clearly to poll 
                                                                                                                                         
 73 Franklin County Board of Elections Special Meeting Transcript from Nov. 19, 2010, at 
PageID No. 8812, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, 
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 20. 
 74 Hamilton County Board of Elections Meeting Transcript from Apr. 25, 2012, at PageID 
No. 8864-65, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available 
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 67-68. 
 75 Under Ohio law, precinct officials are formally called “judges of election” with the 
official in charge at a precinct titled the “presiding judge.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.22 
(LexisNexis 2014). Increasingly, in manuals and training these workers are described as 
“precinct election officials” and a presiding judge often names a “voting location manager” 
for multiple-precinct locations. As is shown in the evidence and depositions reviewed in this 
section, the term “poll worker” is still commonly used and will be used throughout this 
Article, though there will also be references to a “presiding judge” where appropriate. 
 76 Franklin County Board of Elections Special Meeting from Nov. 14, 2008, at PageID 
No. 8844-45, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available 
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 47-48. 
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worker error. The Board considered the fact that the ballot was cast in the wrong 
precinct, but the Board decided to reject the ballot anyway. Before the motion to 
reject the ballots was carried, one membered explained: 
[T]hese were done at the polling place and they actually went to the 
correct polling place but the polling place has maybe two or three 
different precincts in it. They went to the wrong table and the poll worker 
is not supposed to vote them unless they’re in their book and if they’re not 
in their book, they’re supposed to call us to see what precinct to send 
them to. They didn’t. They just voted them on a provisional ballot.  
The Board then rejected the ballots.77 
3. Failure to Record Information  
In March 2012, Butler County Board of Elections noticed record keeping 
problems with provisional ballots as "there is no way to differentiate which poll 
worker . . . processed the provisional ballot. Each location had a minimum of one 
poll worker processing provisional ballots incorrectly . . . ."78 Record keeping issues 
were also prevalent in the November 2008 Election in Adams County, especially in 
Bratton and Winchester Townships.79  
4. Failure to Make Accommodations for Disabilities or Health Problems  
Poll workers are required to make certain reasonable accommodations to voters 
with disabilities or health problems.80 However, these standards are not applied 
evenly or correctly. In the March 2012 election in Franklin County, if the Board of 
Elections determined that a signature voter’s signature was different any notes or 
information from poll workers regarding any apparent illness or injury would be 
considered.81 However, if the poll worker does not give the voter an opportunity to 
explain the reason for the change, then the Board of Elections will not make any 
                                                                                                                                         
 77 Ross County Board of Elections Board Meeting from Mar. 21, 2012, at PageID No. 
8950, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsAA-MM.pdf, at 17. 
 78 Butler County Board of Elections Board Meeting Minutes from Mar. 19, 2012, at 
PageID No. 8747, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, 
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsA-M.pdf, at 
110. 
 79 “Bratton Township books were not well maintained. The pollworkers did not document 
clearly how some voters chose to vote, whether paper or machine as well as did not do 
Provisionals correctly. Winchester Township pollworkers neglected to write down 11 voter 
names in the pollbook.” Adams County Board of Elections Meeting Minutes from Nov. 19, 
2008, at PageId No. 8718, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-
00896, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsA-
M.pdf, at 81. 
 80 Myths about Voting and Voters with Disabilities, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http:// 
www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/Voters/voterswithdisabilities/ADAmyths.aspx. 
 81 Franklin County Board of Elections Special Meeting Mar. 19, 2012, at PageID No. 
8788, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsA-M.pdf, at 151. 
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future contact with the voter to determine whether the change in signature was 
caused by a medical condition.82  
5. Failure to Direct Voters at All  
Clinton and Clermont Counties’ poll workers struggled with providing voters 
with even the most basic information at times. In 2010, the Clermont County Board 
of Elections noted that there were voters “going from precinct to precinct to find 
their locale with workers not checking [a] street guide.”83 In Clinton County in 2012, 
the Board of Elections noted multiple instances of deficient/erroneous signage at 
polling locations that led to significant confusion amongst voters.84 Yet, this may 
have been seen as an improvement on Clinton County in 2008 where it was 
discovered that especially in multi-precinct locations there was a complete lack of 
overall instruction.85 
6. Failure to Instruct Voters Properly on How to Complete a Ballot 
There are numerous examples of poll workers failing to complete provisional 
ballot paperwork correctly.86 Throughout the state, poll workers placed provisional 
ballots in the wrong envelopes and failed to sign provisional ballot envelopes.87 In 
Stark County in 2010, one precinct was described as “messed up” as “[p]oll workers 
had provisional voters fill out provisional envelope but placed voted ballot in a 
privacy envelope.”88 
7. Failure to Handle Properly Completed Ballots 
In Hamilton County in 2010, poll workers placed ballots in the wrong piles. Even 
though voters submitted ballots for the correct precinct, poll workers improperly put 
the ballots in the pile of “wrong precinct” ballots.89   
                                                                                                                                         
 82 Id.  
 83 Clermont County Record of Problem Sheet from Nov. 2, 2010, at PageID No. 9088, 
NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at http:// 
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsNN-PP.pdf, at 49. 
 84 Examples include: “Need a sign stating 2A voting Osborn Rm. w/ arrow pointing in 
right direction.”; “Need a sign stating—1A Voting Community Rm.”; “Want blue and white 
and table signs that say Village of Midland.” Second Supplemental Reply Declaration of 
Daniel Miller, at PageID No. 5560, SEIU v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:12-
cv-00562, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ 
SEIUSEcondSupplementalDeclarationofDanielBMiller.pdf, at 5. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Declaration of Daniel B. Miller in Support of Motion to Modify, at PageID No. 8631-
33, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/DeclarationofDanielBMillerinSupp
ortofMotiontoModify.pdf, at 32-34. 
 87 Id. at 33. 
 88 Id. at 34. 
 89 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Preliminary 
Injunction, at PageID No. 1378, Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th 
Cir. 2011), No. 1:10-cv-00820, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/ 
documents/Hunter-Order-1-12-11.pdf, at 4. 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
294 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:279 
8. General Voter Error 
In March 2012, the Huron County Board of Elections actually rejected a ballot 
because the voter signed his or her name at the top of an envelope rather than 
printing the name. The Board rejected the provisional ballot “because the voter 
signed their name at the top of the envelope instead of printing it. The Director 
contacted the Secretary of State for an opinion on this error and was advised by them 
that it is a fatal error.”90 In Mercer County, the Board of Elections rejected a 
provisional ballot because the voter voted in the wrong precinct, even though there 
was no indication that it was the voter’s fault.91 Because there was no indication of 
poll worker error, the Board attributed the error to the voter.92 
9. Error in Poll Workers’ Materials 
In counties throughout the state, poll workers’ materials were deficient as well. 
In 2010 in Hamilton County, the Board of Elections found that poll workers 
struggled to use street lists correctly, especially when odd and even street numbers 
made the difference between precincts.93 There are also numerous statewide 
examples of addresses not appearing in poll books94, streets being confusingly 
organized in poll books,95 and electronic polls books with deficient designations of 
precincts.96 
                                                                                                                                         
 90 Huron County Board of Election Meeting Minutes of Mar. 20, 2012, at PageID No. 
8919, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 122. 
 91 The authors reject the notion that fault should be the measure by which ballots are 
evaluated, as will be explained more thoroughly below, but reference here to the purported 
“fault” was considered appropriate as it framed the decision of the Board at the time. 
 92 Supplemental Reply Declaration of Daniel B. Miller, at PageID No. 4234 ¶ 12, SEIU v. 
Husted, 698 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:12-cv-00562, available at http://moritzlaw.osu. 
edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/SEIUAffidavitofDanielBMiller.pdf, at 5 (citing Mercer 
County Board of Election Meeting Minutes from Mar. 20, 2012, Exhibit H at 2). 
 93 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Preliminary 
Injunction, at PageID No. 1378, Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th 
Cir. 2011), No. 1:10-cv-00820, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/ 
documents/Hunter-Order-1-12-11.pdf, at 4. 
 94 “Voter’s ‘new address is not listed in book of street guide[.]’ (Franklin County 2011) 
(Ex. SS at 13).”  Declaration of Daniel B. Miller, at PageID No. 8628, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 
F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election 
law/litigation/documents/DeclarationofDanielBMillerinSupportofMotiontoModify.pdf, at 29. 
 95 “’Voter’s address did not appear in the proper place in the CWSRG. ‘East Maple’ 
address in on[e] range was listed under ‘E’. Neighboring addresses were under ‘M[.]’ [P]wers 
were able to locate the address using another Precinct’s EP unit.’ (Stark County 2012) (Ex. 
WW at 3).” Id. 
 96 “’The E-Books (computer) indicates voters’ Precinct as ‘3’ only, & does not specify ‘A’ 
or ‘B.’ Both HUB-3A and HUB-3B are in the same polling location. We’ve found that voters’ 
names are appearing on Both computers.’ (Montgomery County 2012) (Ex. UU at 3).” Id.  
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10. Errors in Preparing Election Materials 
During the March 2012 Primary Election in Lorain County, the Board of 
Elections minutes described the decision to reject ballots that were not properly 
completed regardless of error. New ballot envelopes put out by the Secretary of State 
required information on two sides of the form, but  
[t]he Secretary of State’s office has confirmed that required information, 
printed name, identification and a signature must be placed on the front of 
the provisional envelope. If this information is missing on the front of the 
envelope, but appears on the back of the envelope, where a voter 
registration form is provided, it cannot be counted.97 
D. Public record and supplied data from Election Day show significant presence of 
error at many levels. 
1. Methodology and Sources of Data (Including Limitations) 
The Boards of Elections were contacted in twenty-six Ohio counties to obtain 
information regarding their acceptance of absentee and provisional ballots in an 
effort to determine whether there were observable patterns in the evaluation of these 
ballots by the county boards for the 2012 November Election.98 These twenty-six 
counties were chosen to show a cross-section of Ohio as they represent the ten 
counties with the highest rate of provisional vote acceptance,99 the ten counties with 
the lowest rate of provisional vote acceptance,100 the three most populous counties,101 
the three least populous counties,102 and four counties representing the median 
population of the counties.103 There was overlap between the counties chosen by 
population and those chosen by provisional acceptance rate resulting in a total of 
twenty-six counties.104 
                                                                                                                                         
 97 Lorain County Board of Elections Meeting Minutes from Mar. 15, 2012, at PageID No. 
8935, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsAA-MM.pdf, at 2. 
 98 Those counties were Carroll, Clark, Cuyahoga, Erie, Franklin, Gallia, Hamilton, 
Hancock, Harrison, Hocking, Huron, Knox, Monroe, Morgan, Noble, Paulding, Pickaway, 
Pike, Putnam, Richland, Seneca, Tuscarawas, Van Wert, Vinton, Wood, and Wyandot. 
 99 Those counties were Harrison, Hancock, Putnam, Erie, Van Wert, Tuscarawas, Pike, 
Noble, Richland, and Wyandot. Provisional Ballot Report: November 6, 2012 General 
Election, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE (2012), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/ 
upload/elections/2012/gen/provisional.xlsx. 
 100 Those counties were Morgan, Hocking, Hamilton, Carroll, Gallia, Wood, Paulding, 
Franklin, Vinton, and Clark. Id.  
 101 Those counties were Cuyahoga, Franklin, and Hamilton. Population Projections: 
County Totals, OHIO DEVELOPMENT SERVICES AGENCY (2013), available at http:// 
development.ohio.gov/files/research/P6090.pdf. 
 102 Those counties were Vinton, Monroe, and Noble. Id.  
 103 Those counties were Pickaway, Seneca, Huron, and Knox. Id.  
 104 Franklin, Hamilton, Noble, and Vinton Counties overlapped. Franklin and Hamilton 
overlapped between the highest population and lowest provisional acceptance rate. Vinton 
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The initial request to the county boards was for “the minutes of meetings wherein 
[boards] determined how to process provisional ballots that may have included 
incomplete or conflicting information as well as the minutes of meetings in which it 
discussed how to process these ballots. Additionally . . . any memoranda or other 
documents produced by the Board regarding the processing of these ballots or voting 
irregularities (or on the interpretation of Secretary Husted's directive 2012-54)” were 
requested.105 Any county that was non-responsive to the first request was contacted 
again for the same request. All counties were generally responsive, with the 
exception of Gallia County. The Gallia County Board of Elections never responded 
to the public records requests made on February 12, 2013, March 6, 2013, and 
March 26, 2013.106 In addition, Tuscarawas County was subject to an election 
challenge so the records had been put under seal and therefore were not provided.107 
Further, the forms submitted for absentee and provisional certifications were not 
requested from the following counties: Clark, Erie, Hamilton, Huron, Knox, Monroe, 
Noble, Paulding, Pike, Richland, Seneca, Tuscarawas, Van Wert, Wood, and 
Wyandot and were therefore not received.108 Each county separately adjudicates why 
ballots are rejected, there are differences in process and decision-making style 
between counties regarding disqualification or acceptance of ballots as discussed 
below. Nonetheless, the records were reviewed and the reasons for acceptance or 
rejection of ballots were placed into a database to be analyzed. 
In addition to requests to the Boards of Elections, requests were made to the 
Secretary of State’s Office for incident information from voter 
protection/information hotlines in operation on Election Day.  Election Protection 
managed by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, a nonprofit 
nonpartisan organization provided their Ohio call-in data as well.109 
2. Evidence Collected from Governmental and Non-Partisan Voter Protection 
Mechanisms  
Call logs from the Ohio Secretary of State’s voter hotline and the non-partisan 
Election Protection voter hotline yield valuable insight into the types of complaints 
and issues that arise on Election Day while also highlighting the significant gaps in 
available information. This information is significant as it reflects the breadth of 
questions and concerns faced by voters, poll observers, and elections officials. It is 
important to note the limited utility of this data as it is reported through self-selected 
individuals who choose to call in without any means of verification, follow-up, or 
contextual analysis.   
                                                                                                                                         
overlapped between the lowest population and lowest provisional acceptance rate. Noble 
overlapped between the lowest population and highest provisional acceptance rate. Id. 
 105 Copies of all requests and received information are maintained by the author. 
 106 Copies of these requests are maintained by the author. 
 107 A copy of the Tuscarawas County explanation of refusal is maintained by the author. 
 108 Copies of all requests and received information are maintained by the author. 
 109 A copy of this information is maintained by the author. Election Protection also makes 
significant data available at http://www.866ourvote.org. 
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i. Ohio Secretary of State Call Sheets 
The Ohio Secretary of State maintained a voter hotline beginning on October 2, 
2012 (the first day of early voting) and continuing through the day after Election 
Day, November 7, 2012. Call center statistics compiled by the Secretary’s office 
report a total of 16,929 calls received with 2,669 of those coming on Election Day.110 
The line was staffed with Secretary of State employees on Election Day from 6 a.m. 
until 8 p.m. For most of the day there were 12 staff members receiving calls at any 
one time though it dipped as low as 10 during the lunch hour with only 6 from 7:30 
p.m. to 8 p.m.111 The hotline staffers tracked call information on tally sheets. 
Twenty-one tally sheets reflect calls received on Election Day and include a total of 
2,219 calls.112  
Calls could be recorded in one of nine categories: absentee ballot; registration; 
polling location; fraud concerns; issues, candidates, etc.; UOCAVA (referring to the 
Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act); Provisional ballot; campaign 
finance; and Other.113 Only the “Other” section includes a prompt to specify the 
nature of the call which is done by brief notes on the sheet itself. Occasionally, 
additional notes are found on the tally sheets. The overall breakdown of calls is 
reflected in Table 1 below.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 110 “Call Center Statistics 2012 Presidential Election” created and released by the Ohio 
Secretary of State’s Office, November 2012. A copy is maintained by the author. 
 111 These numbers are found on the call line schedule received by the authors in response to 
a public records request to the Secretary of State. A copy is maintained by the author. 
 112 These tally sheets were received by the authors in response to a public records request 
of the Secretary’s office. A copy is maintained by the author. No effort is made to determine 
the discrepancy between the reported number of 2,669 reported calls and 2,219 calls reflected 
on the tally sheets. It seems possible that certain elementary questions were not always 
recorded or the reported total number includes individuals who called in but ultimately hung 
up. In the end, such a determination is irrelevant to the overall analysis. 
 113 The authors requested any guidance, manuals, or special training that supported the 
hotline work and was referred to the Precinct Election Official Quick Reference Guide for 
November 2012, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE (July 2012), available at http://www.sos.state.oh. 
us/SOS/Upload/elections/EOresources/peoTraining/PEOFlipchart-2012General.pdf. 
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Table 1: Ohio Secretary of State November 2012 Election Day Call Data 
Category Number of Calls Percentage of Calls 
Absentee Ballot 95 4.3% 
Registration 588 26.5%
Polling Location 561 25.3% 
Fraud Concerns 126 5.7% 
Issues, Candidates, etc. 19 0.9% 
UOCAVA 34 1.5% 
Provisional Ballot 424 19.1% 
Campaign Finance 7 0.3%
Other 365 16.4% 
Totals 2219 100%114 
 
The three highest categories of registration, polling location, and provisional 
ballots are not surprising for a voter line operating on Election Day. Some of the 
notes regarding the “other calls” are particularly relevant to concerns regarding 
Election Day mistakes. They include calls with notations “forced to vote 
prov.[provisional],” “Upset about being asked for ID—or not asked,” and “poll 
worker error.”115 Further, there was a notation on a call tallied in the “fraud” section 
which stated “observer pulled voter—told to go to old location.”116 Without context 
or follow-up it is impossible to assess whether or not these calls reflect actual or 
simply perceived errors, but they do highlight the scope of Election Day questions. 
ii. Election Protection Call Data 
Election Protection is a nonpartisan coalition “formed to ensure that all voters 
have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process.”117 Election 
Protection runs the nationwide 1-866-OUR-VOTE hotline with the Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. This is a national operation, which includes 
local volunteers who are trained and given access to materials to take calls, track 
data, and respond to voter concerns leading up to and on Election Day.118 In response 
to request from the authors, Election Protection provided a spreadsheet of call 
information collected in Ohio during the 2012 election cycle.119 This section 
examines the calls received on Election Day.  
                                                                                                                                         
 114 Note: due to rounding, the percentages are not exact, but happened to add up to 100%. 
 115 “11/6/2012 General Election Tally Sheet” 11/6/2012, Lisa Grotsky (note regarding 
forced provisional) “11/6/2012 General Election Call Tally Sheet”, 11/6/2012, Heather Kash 
(note regarding identification). “11/6/2012 General Election Call Tally Sheet” 11/6/12 Kathy 
Spinelli (note regarding poll worker error). Copies are maintained by the author. 
 116 “11/6/2012 General Election Call Tally Sheet” 11/6/12 Kathy Spinelli. A copy is 
maintained by the author. 
 117 About Us, ELECTION PROTECTION, http://www.866ourvote.org/about. 
 118 For more information on Election Protection, administered by the Lawyers’ Committee 
for Civil Rights Under Law, visit http://www.866ourvote.org. 
 119 A copy of the spreadsheet is maintained by the author. 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss2/4
2014] PERFECT IS THE ENEMY OF FAIR 299 
 
The spreadsheet from Election Protection contains 717 Election Day calls. In 
addition to some basic demographic and caller information, the log includes a subset 
label and a description. While 123 of the calls had no subset indicated, many of them 
also had multiple subsets included. In order to appropriately represent the proportion 
of concerns raised by callers, Table 2 below reflects the total number of times a 
subset was included with any call record and the percentage of calls that included a 
particular subset. 
 
Table 2: Election Protection November 2012 Election Day Ohio Call Data 
Subset Label Number of Mentions Percentage of Calls 
which include subset 
Absentee Voting Inquiry 11 1.5% 
Absentee Voting Problem 30 4.2% 
Accessibility Problem 2 0.3% 
Criminal Status Related 
Inquiry 
7 1.0% 
Electioneering Problem 3 0.4% 
ID Problem 38 5.3% 
None/Other 123 17.2% 
Polling Place Inquiry 303 42.3% 
Polling Place Problem 52 7.3% 
Poll worker Problem 37 5.2% 
Provisional Ballot 
Concern 
42 5.9% 
Registration Inquiry 129 18.0% 
Registration Problem 48 6.7% 
Student Voting Problem 3 0.4% 
Voter Intimidation 
Problem 
16 2.2% 
Voting Equipment 
Problem 
31 4.3% 
 
In addition to the statistical analysis, the description that is included for almost 
every call is illustrative of the range of calls and the types of problems that occur. 
While a majority of the calls are inquiry based, a significant number raise red flags 
indicative of substantial error by poll workers. In one instance, a voter inadvertently 
cast an over vote (i.e. the voter selected more than one candidate for a race, but when 
the in-precinct scanner gave the option to recast, the poll worker selected “no” on 
behalf of the voter. There was a report of ballots being given out without proper 
security or verification of registration status. Complaints included poll workers 
requiring photo identification. A voter reported being turned away because he had 
the same name as his father who had already voted. One voter reported having cast a 
regular ballot, but not signing the poll book until she returned later in the day to sign. 
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More than one report had voters being sent to multiple potential polling locations. It 
is impossible to determine how these reported incidents impacted voters.120 
There is also a clear trend in the data that in some cases, voters call in to report 
an alleged wrongdoing that actually reflects the voter misunderstanding Ohio law. 
More than one caller expressed concern about a passport being rejected as 
identification, but that is correct under Ohio’s identification requirement. One report 
said voters in a long line were given provisional ballots, but it’s possible that the 
precinct was using regular paper ballots in addition to DREs to speed the line as they 
are required to do. Election day friction and the perception of voters are regarding 
the accuracy and effectiveness of election policy could be improved not only by 
better-informed poll workers, but by more aggressive outreach and education of 
voters.121 
The Election Protection hotline data reveals that while most Election Day calls 
were simple inquiries, those that discuss election procedure failures highlight the 
significant occurrence of Election Day mistakes.  
3. Review of handling of provisional and absentee ballots county by county as it 
pertains to Election Day procedure (evidence of voter or poll worker error). 
As described in the methodology section above, information was requested from 
26 counties. Twenty-five counties responded, and the information was reviewed for 
evidence of Election Day errors and to determine some of the good, the bad, and the 
ugly of how potential problems are reviewed and resolved. Several important 
observations revealed throughout the course of this review are discussed here. 
Related recommendations are considered in a later section. 
i. Issues at the Polls 
There is no formal mechanism in place to capture the reasons why voters were 
given provisional ballots in the first place,122 especially when provisional acceptance 
rates are very high.123 These high rates may indicate that counties are correctly 
steering voters to cast provisional ballots—for example, if they have moved and 
have appeared to vote in their new polling location. Alternately, it could be 
indicative of counties steering too many voters to provisional ballots when a regular 
ballot would have been appropriate in the first place.124 Without more context, there 
is no way to definitively understand the vast difference between these two outcomes 
by looking at the acceptance rate.  
                                                                                                                                         
 120 These examples are all taken from the Election Protection Ohio spreadsheet, a copy of 
which is on file with the author. 
 121 Id. 
 122 The formal data collection mechanisms lack a reason for most provisional ballots as will 
be highlighted in Part III.D.4, infra. 
 123 Counties that were very high include: Harrison County, with a provisional acceptance 
rate of 97.54%; Putnam County, with a provisional acceptance rate of 95.26%; and Hancock 
County, with a provisional acceptance rate of 95.26%. See County Certification and SoS Data, 
on file with the author. 
 124 The review of county records did not reveal instances of an individual being given a 
provisional ballot who should have been given a regular ballot.  
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Similarly sized counties can vary widely in number of provisional ballots cast.125 
In Franklin County where there were 808,578 registered voters for the 2012 general 
election (total population 1.19 million, source: 2012 Quickfacts Census) there were 
29,840 provisional ballots cast. In slightly more populous Cuyahoga County, where 
there were 927,996 registered voters for the 2012 general election (total population 
1.27 million, source: Quickfacts Census) there were nearly 3,000 fewer provisional 
ballots cast (26,990), amounting to about a 10% difference.126 This variation is 
further reflected in the rate of provisional ballots accepted. Franklin County had a 
provisional rejection rate of 20.55% whereas Cuyahoga had a provisional rejection 
rate of 15.27%.127 
There have been numerous efforts to evaluate the overall functionality of 
provisional balloting systems including through litigation and this paper does not 
attempt to build on them. This effort initially intended to evaluate the role of 
Election Day error and make recommendations. That the reason for provisional 
ballots being issued is not part of the data collection process highlights what has 
become a primary conclusion of the authors: that we need to collect more and better 
data. Until such data exists it is difficult to draw further conclusions about any error 
rate that may exist in the issuance of provisional ballots. 
ii. Issues of Interpretation 
For those board minutes where we can read through boards’ discussions on 
whether to accept ballots, they are generally consistent in their interpretations, citing 
the Secretary of State’s directives and common sense (e.g., Pickaway County 
referred to Secretary of State’s directive to address ‘double-bubble’ issue). Further, 
where there was a question, as with the Franklin County Board which requested 
advice from the Secretary of State to resolve an issue of voters who had signed the 
poll book and voted provisionally.128 Boards do not appear to wantonly throw away 
                                                                                                                                         
 125 This problem is not new, by any means. In the November 2006 election, “Ohio’s eighty-
eight Boards of Elections applied widely different and unequal standards to provisional ballots 
cast.” Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 1, NEOCH 
v. Brunner, (S.D. Ohio 2008), No. C2-06-896 available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/ 
electionlaw/litigation/documents/NEOCH-MotionforPI-10-14-08.pdf, at 3. The data from that 
election describes significant variation: the average rejection rate of provisional ballots in 
Ohio was 18.1%, but the rejection rate varied from 0.85% (Coshocton County) to 43.1% 
(Belmont County). Id. at Exhibit C. Five Boards of Elections had a rejection rate of more than 
30% and six Boards of Elections had a rejection rate of less than 5%. Twenty-six Boards of 
Elections rejected 459 ballots because the voter was determined to be ineligible—Belmont 
County Board of Elections rejected 12.4% of its provisional ballots on this basis, while 62 
Boards of Elections, including Lucas, Hamilton, Montgomery, and Stark, did not reject any 
ballots on this basis. Sixty-four Boards of Elections rejected 2726 provisional ballots because 
the voter did not provide the required information. 
 126 Official Results for 2012 General Election, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos. 
state.oh.us/sos/upload/elections/2012/gen/FinalResults.xlsx; Provisional Ballot Report for 
2012 General Election, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/ 
elections/2012/gen/provisional.xlsx. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Franklin County Meeting Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, at 33-34 (Decision to make 
request of Secretary of State’s office for clarification on proper course of action when the poll 
book was signed and a provisional ballot was cast.); Franklin County Meeting Minutes from 
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ballots or reject ballots that should clearly be accepted. Most boards act unanimously 
in rejecting or accepting ballots. Very few board decisions were or 3-1 and no votes 
in the selected counties were 2-2, which would have required a tiebreak by the 
Secretary of State.129 
iii. Recordkeeping Concerns 
County boards’ minutes are often inconsistent regarding the number of ballots 
they evaluate and what is reported to the Secretary of State.130 In some instances, 
there is a progression over time where county boards only process a certain number 
of provisional ballots at each meeting or sometimes more provisional ballots are 
found at a later date131 There is also a concern that within board minutes themselves, 
sometimes the numbers do not add up correctly.132  
With respect to board minutes, the minutes of some counties reported the same 
numbers of acceptance and rejections as their later certifications and the resulting 
                                                                                                                                         
Nov. 21, 2012, at 4-5 (feedback for Secretary of State and decision to exclude ballots). Copies 
of both minutes on file with author. 
 129 Most decisions were unanimous. See, e.g., Wood County Meeting Minutes from Nov. 
21, 2012 (all decisions on provisional ballots were made unanimously). In contrast, Hamilton 
County had some 3-1 votes. Hamilton County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 
2012, at 43 (3-1 vote on counting wrong location ballots given to voters during early in-person 
voting). There were no tie votes on the counting of provisional ballots submitted to the 
Secretary of State. See 2012 Tie Votes, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh. 
us/SOS/elections/electionsofficials/Rules/2012tievotes.aspx. 
 130 See, e.g., Franklin County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, Nov. 21, 
2012, and Nov. 26, 2012 (numerous revisions made to the number of ballots in different 
categories make it impossible to track final totals through the minutes); Clark County Board 
of Elections Meeting Transcript from Nov. 26, 2012, at 94; Monroe County Board of 
Elections Minutes from Nov. 19, 2012, at 2. Copies maintained by the author. 
 131 Franklin County Board of Elections Minutes from Dec. 6, 2012, at 4-5 (33 provisional 
ballots were found after certification had been made), at 5-6 (14 paper ballots found after 
certification); Cuyahoga County Board of Election Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012 and Nov. 27, 
2012. Copies maintained by the author. 
 132 Cuyahoga County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012 and Nov. 27, 2012; 
Franklin County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, Nov. 21, 2012, and Nov. 26, 
2012 (numerous revisions made to the number of ballots in different categories make it 
impossible to track final totals through the minutes); Monroe County Board of Elections 
Minutes from Nov. 19, 2012, at 1-3 Through correspondence on records between the author 
and the Secretary of States office, it was learned that through the formal canvass process and 
processing by the Secretary of State for final certification some counts are adjusted or 
clarified, but that the counties do not necessarily file updated reports. Record on file with 
author. This could explain the discrepancies, but in any case the final official canvass becomes 
the count. Although better records are always something to strive for, it would be 
contradictory for the authors to simultaneously advocate for recognition and tolerance of error 
by voter and poll workers and a knee jerk condemnation of record irregularities. Copies of 
relevant documents are on file with the author. See also Provisional Ballot Report for 2012 
General Election, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/ 
Research/electResultsMain/2012Results.aspx. 
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Secretary of State’s totals.133 Some county board minutes partially matched their 
later certifications and the resulting Secretary of State’s totals.134 Cuyahoga County’s 
minutes did not match their later certification or the resulting Secretary of State’s 
totals.135 Franklin County’s certification matched the total rejections and acceptances 
declared in the Board minutes. However, within the Board minutes themselves, those 
totals did not result from adding the subgroups of rejected and accepted provisional 
ballots.136 
In larger counties, the Boards of Elections tends to vote to accept or reject 
provisional and absentee ballots based on staff recommendations and they process 
groups of ballots over multiple meetings.137 Several counties included no discussion 
of why ballots were rejected in their board minutes,138 whereas other counties 
include an exhaustive discussion.139 Other county minutes have groups of ballots 
                                                                                                                                         
 133 Carroll County Board of Elections Special Meeting—Official Canvas Nov. 19, 2012, at 
5, Official Certification for Absentee Ballots Nov. 6, 2012, General Election and Official 
Certification for Provisional Ballots Nov. 6, 2012; Harrison County Board of Elections 
Meeting Minutes Nov. 19, 2012, at 5, Official Certification for Absentee Ballots Nov. 6, 
2012; Morgan County Provisional Ballot Certification for Nov. 2012 Election and Minutes 
Dec. 3, 2012; Putnam County Board of Elections Minutes Nov. 19, 2012, at 188-89; Vinton 
County Board of Elections Minutes Nov. 19, 2012, Certification of Provisional Ballots for the 
Nov. 2012 Election. Copies of relevant documents are on file with the author. See also 
Provisional Ballot Report for 2012 General Election, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www. 
sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/Research/electResultsMain/2012Results.aspx. 
 134 Hancock County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 26, 2012, at 24; Hocking 
County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 26, 2012; Pickaway County Board of Elections 
Minutes from Nov. 19, 2012, at 3-4. Copies of relevant documents are on file with the author.  
 135 Cuyahoga County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012 and Nov. 27, 2012. 
Copies maintained by the author.  
 136 Franklin County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, Nov. 21, 2012, and 
Nov. 26, 2012 (numerous revisions made to the number of ballots in different categories make 
it impossible to track final totals through the minutes). Copies of relevant documents are on 
file with the author.  
 137 Cuyahoga County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012 and Nov. 27, 2012; 
Franklin County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, Nov. 21, 2012, and Nov. 26, 
2012 (numerous revisions made to the number of ballots in different categories make it 
impossible to track final totals through the minutes). Copies of relevant documents are on file 
with the author. 
 138 Monroe County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 19, 2012, at 1-2; Morgan 
County Board of Elections Provisional Ballot Policy and Board Minutes from Dec. 3, 2012; 
Pike County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, at 1; Van Wert County Board of 
Elections Minutes from Nov. 21, 2012, at 2; Wood County Board of Elections Minutes from 
Nov. 26, 2012; Wyandot County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 21, 2012. Copies of 
relevant documents are on file with the author. 
 139 See, e.g., Carroll County Board of Elections Special Meeting—Official Canvas Nov. 19, 
2012, at 2-4; Clark County Board of Elections Meeting Transcript from Nov. 26, 2012, at 12-
94; Hamilton County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 26, 2012, at 5-15; Pickaway 
County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 19, 2012, at 2-4. The detail maintained 
significantly increases when a County uses a transcript of the board hearing as minutes rather 
than a separate summary document. Copies of relevant documents are on file with the author. 
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recommended for rejection or acceptance for specific reasons but do not include 
totals of provisional ballots accepted or rejected.140 
For counties whose minutes do not detail reasons for provisional acceptance or 
rejection, there is no indication from any board as to where the data is stored or why 
details that emerge in the Secretary of State filings (“certifications”) are not present 
in the board minutes themselves. No organized system for cataloging election-day 
errors exists in Ohio or on a national level so it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
identify common problems that occur in a quantitative or trackable way.141 This 
information would be helpful in analyzing recurrent problems and identifying 
solutions when the problems do occur (see “Franklin County Data” spreadsheet for a 
call log tally and brief description of common problems). 
In Carroll County there was an internal policy for precinct officials to call the 
Board of Elections prior to issuing a provisional ballot. Some locations did not 
follow the policy, resulting in provisional ballots that were not counted due to 
“voting in an incorrect precinct/location”142  
In general, there was an attempt made to use provisional ballot numbers and 
processing information as a proxy for the overall quality of elections in a particular 
county and to give evidence of the nature of Election Day errors at the polls. This 
review has in fact revealed that our current provisional ballot issuing and evaluation 
mechanisms vary county to county and do not provide sufficient indication of the 
underlying cause or issue that resulted in a provisional ballot being cast. This Article 
does not attempt to determine which boards have the “better” mechanism for ballot 
evaluation and recognizes that the needs of boards are likely to differ with 
population and number of ballots cast. The significant variation and discrepancy is 
relevant on its own face as reflective of the imperfect system which every election 
inherently is.  
4. Review of incidents recorded either at or through calls from precincts on  
Election Day. 
In Ohio, all precincts maintain notes or incidents for events occurring at the 
polling place on Election Day. There are forms promulgated by the Secretary of 
State’s office (Forms 450 and 475) or counties can use their own system. Frequently 
there is a separate collection process for machine, poll book, and other Election Day 
                                                                                                                                         
 140 Hancock County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 26, 2012, at 24; Hocking 
County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 26, 2012. Copies of relevant documents are on 
file with the author. 
 141 New Mexico has made particular headway in this area by explicitly allowing for 
academic election observers who can create both reports for election officials and peer 
reviewed articles on their findings. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-3.2 (2011). As used in the Election 
Code, "election observer" means a person registered with the United States Department of 
State as an international election observer or a person registered with the New Mexico 
Secretary of State who is an academic engaged in research on elections and the election 
process. Id. 
 142 Carroll County Incident Logs from Nov. 6, 2012; Carroll County Board of Elections 
Special Meeting—Official Canvass from Nov. 19, 2012, at 3-4. Copies maintained by the 
author.  
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problems.143 Through public records requests these documents from the November 
2012 election were collected from 24 of the 26 target counties. The volume of 
information varied greatly county to county from no incident sheets reported to more 
than 2,000 pages of information.144 Review of these documents emphasizes 
limitations in the way Election Day information is collected, but also themes of 
where errors occur.145 These areas are: general ballot handling, incomplete or 
improper offering or processing of provisional ballots, improper voter processing by 
poll workers, and mistakes created by voters. 
First a note about the records themselves: these are handwritten documents 
completed under the pressure and rush of Election Day. The Form 450 asks for 
identifying information and the resolution, but there is little guidance for voters and 
the form is often incomplete. Entries such as “voter error” occurring in one precinct 
five times without further explanation are common and prevent analysis.146 Even 
looser are the logs without any prompt to provide a solution or identifying 
information and items like Wood County’s general comment page. At times 
potentially relevant data is obscured through bad handwriting or poor copy quality.147 
These limitations make a quantitative analysis of precinct reports from November 
2012 virtually impossible. This is an area where significant improvement could 
occur if standardized reporting mechanisms were developed which would balance 
the flexibility needed to accommodate the range of election experience against the 
desire to have quantifiable reporting. 
General ballot handling concerns include reports of what may be either machine 
or human error, failure to properly distribute and then recollect paper ballots, and 
occasionally provisional ballot control problems. This includes accounting for 
                                                                                                                                         
 143 The Ohio Secretary of State has promulgated Form 450, “Election Day Precinct Event 
Log,” for Election Day incidents and Form 475, “Voting Unit Event Log,” for machine error. 
Both forms are available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electionsofficials/ 
forms.aspx. Different counties have created and maintained their own systems. For example, 
Wood County has both targeted forms and a general comments section, while Franklin County 
has problems and corrections options within the signature poll books and separate event logs 
as part of a precinct workbook. The forms for both counties for the November 2012 election 
are on file with the author. 
 144 No incidents were reported by Harrison, Monroe, Morgan, Pickaway, or Putnam 
Counties. Copies of the confirming correspondence are on file with the author. Cuyahoga 
County supplied a file of more than 2,000 pages of precinct level logs, though that included 
blank sheets and some precincts with nothing to report. A copy is maintained by the author.  
 145 For twenty-one of the twenty-four counties, every record was examined. For Cuyahoga, 
Franklin, and Hamilton counties, the volume of records made this impractical and of limited 
benefit to the scope of this Article. Applying a list of random numbers (generated by 
http://www.random.org) to either the page or stamped indexing numbers of the documents 
supplied from the counties, a 10% sample from each county was selected for review. 
 146 Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #1038 from Cuyahoga County, Precinct 
East Cleveland 04 E (Nov. 6, 2012) (on file with the author). 
 147 See, e.g., Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record # Unknown from Precinct 
Sandusky H, Erie County (Nov. 6, 2012) (form cannot be read). A copy is maintained by the 
author.  
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ballots at the end of the day revealing discrepancies.148 When a ballot-scanning 
machine in Cuyahoga County was offline, it was the policy for the poll workers to 
collect the ballots and scan them through at the end of the evening or when the 
machine came back online and was available.149 In Clark County, among others, a 
provisional voter sent his ballot through the scanner and into the ballot box instead 
of placing it in the provisional ballot envelope.150 The use of ballot stubs (removable 
processing sections of paper ballots) was a source of problems. Provisional ballot 
stubs were improperly removed151 and occasionally voters were able to process 
regular ballots with stubs when they should have been removed. Certain machines 
appear likely to “time out” with notations of such votes being cancelled, but it is 
impossible to tell from reports if the ballot was reissued or the voter was ultimately 
unable to vote.152 
Provisional ballots are a known area of concern and that is reflected in these 
reports. Erie County Board of Elections’ decision to institute a call-in approval 
                                                                                                                                         
 148 For example, in Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #181 from Cuyahoga 
County, Precinct Brook Park 01 C (Nov. 6, 2012), the final count was missing four ballots. 
Similarly, in Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #337 from Cuyahoga County, 
Precinct Southeast Seventh Day Adventist (Nov. 6, 2012), a voter in an electric wheelchair 
was given a ballot and told to return to the poll worker after completing it for placement in an 
envelope (whether a provisional or disability envelope was not mentioned), but the voter left 
without turning the ballot in. Copies maintained by the author. 
 149 See Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #962 from Cuyahoga County, Precinct 
Cleveland Heights 03 C (Nov. 6, 2012) (“Ballots from 04E and 03E was mistakenly scanned 
in 03C and placed in the gray ballot box until the end of day and scanned the correct precinct 
at the end.”). This policy is troubling due to differences in how ballots are considered when 
scanned at the precinct compared to those counted at a central location. When a voter scans 
her ballot, she has the option to check for over and under votes and make corrections and must 
confirm the casting or risk the ballot being canceled as a fleeing voter. In contrast, when the 
voter does not scan his own ballot it should be centrally scanned such that over and under 
votes can be evaluated for voter intent. Under a current Secretary of State directive and 
proposed legislation, when a voter selects but also writes in a candidate, the vote is only 
counted if the ballot is centrally processed. The bulk scanning of ballots by poll workers at the 
precinct undermines the primary support for the disparate treatment—that the voter could 
correct problems with and in-precinct over vote. A copy is maintained by the author.  
 150 Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record # Unknown from Clark County, Precinct T4 
(Nov. 6, 2012) (copy on file with author); see also Election Day Precinct Incident Report 
Record #234 from Cuyahoga County, Precinct Cleveland 01 B (Nov. 6, 2012) (voter filled out 
provisional ballot but then ran ballot through scanner without knowledge of workers); see also 
Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #220 from Cuyahoga County, Luis Munoz Marin 
Middle School (Nov. 6, 2012) (machine accepted such a ballot). 
 151 See, e.g., Election Day Precinct Incident Logs from Carroll County, Lou Township 
Harlem Springs (Nov. 6, 2012) (copy on file with author) (reported a judge tearing off the 
stubs and as correction placing them in the envelope with the ballot); Election Day Incident 
Log Record #167 from Cuyahoga County (Nov. 6, 2012) (stubs were removed before sealing 
of a provisional ballot, stubs sealed with ballot); Election Day Incident Log from Hamilton 
County, Precinct Cincinnati 4-G (Nov. 6, 2012) (voter scanned a provisional ballot). 
 152 See, e.g., Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Carroll County, Precinct Carr B 
(Nov. 6, 2012) (copy on file with author) (“Machine Time Out Vote Cancelled.”). 
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requirement was highly problematic based on these reports.153 The call in system 
failed to alleviate disparate treatment of voters as in one precinct a voter with a 
different name in the book than what she offered verbally and on her identification 
was permitted to vote a regular ballot with another precinct where a voter who had a 
middle name listed on his drivers license but not in the poll book was required to 
cast a provisional ballot.154  In many cases there is enough information to conclude a 
provisional ballot should have been offered, but no assurance that it was. In a 
Franklin County Precinct, the poll workers report finding a name in the supplemental 
poll book after the voter already voted provisionally,155 this voter should have voted 
a regular ballot, but was at risk of disenfranchisement if there is a technical error in 
his provisional ballot form. Though many of the reports reflect a problem in 
processing a provisional vote;156 there are also notations where a regular ballot was 
cast which should have been provisional.157 There are also discrepancies between 
                                                                                                                                         
 153 This policy was adopted by Erie County based on the incident reports in addition to 
Carroll County discussed in the provisional balloting section. Numerous precincts have 
incidents that reflect long wait times for provisional ballots, voters leaving without casting a 
ballot, and general problems in reaching the Board of Elections for approval. Even more 
problematic, the approval process included a search for the voter’s registration information. 
Thought not clear, it appears that if the Board reported a voter as not registered, he or she was 
not given a provisional ballot. Such on-demand registration evaluation undercuts the purpose 
of provisional ballots, which are to protect voters who are not listed in a poll book, but assert 
their eligibility to vote. The entire Erie County incident file is illustrative of this problem. A 
copy is on file with the author. 
 154 Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record Mar #1 from Erie County, Precinct Martin 
P4 (Nov. 6, 2012) (copies on file with author). 
 155 LID #5005 from Franklin County, Precinct I-L Zone #1 (Nov. 6, 2012). A copy is 
maintained by the author.  
 156 See, e.g., Provisional Pink Memo 4-P from Cuyahoga County, Addison Square 
Apartments (Nov. 6, 2012) (“wrong date, voter putting address in wrong place, missing ballot 
number”). These types of flaws on the provisional ballot form could easily result in a vote 
being rejected even if the voter is otherwise qualified. See also Provisional Notes from 
Hamilton County, Cincinnati Anderson CC (Nov. 6, 2012) (three voters were instructed to 
sign the wrong side of the provisional envelope and the error was called into the Board); 
Provisional Pink Memo 73-P from Cuyahoga County, Cleveland Korean Presb. Church (Nov. 
6, 2012) (a number of voters are referenced as “not signing” but it is unclear if this refers to 
the provisional log, which is a county level accounting mechanism, or the provisional 
envelope, where a lack of signature will result in the vote being rejected); LID #2152 from 
Franklin County, Precinct Workbook Zone #2 Saint Stephen’s Community House (Nov. 6, 
2012) (judge used handicapped rather than provisional envelopes for paper ballots for the first 
three hours of the—it is unclear how these errors would impact the ultimate counting of the 
votes, but it would result in voter accounting discrepancies as handicapped voters do sign the 
poll book whereas provisional voters do not). Copies are maintained by the author. 
 157 Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Carroll County, Augusta Precinct (Nov. 6, 
2012) (“[Name withheld from publication] voted electronic should have been prov.” Why the 
vote should have been provisional is not included); see also Election Day Precinct Incident 
Log Record #380 from Cuyahoga County, Cleveland 04M (Nov. 6, 2012) (“should have voted 
Absentee He voted regular ballot”); Provisional Notes from Hamilton County, Cincinnati 
Anderson A (Nov. 6, 2012) (discovered at the end of the day that a voter listed as having 
received an absentee ballot voted a regular ballot); Form 450 from Hamilton County, 
Cincinnati 13D (Nov. 6, 2012) (through misreading of instructions five voters were given a 
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precincts and counties on when a provisional ballot is required. An apparent typo in 
a name or address could result in either a voter receiving a regular or provisional 
ballot depending on the county or precinct in which a voter resided.158 In one case a 
voter with a name change was able to cast a regular ballot by showing a marriage 
license as an additional form of identification.159 Though ultimately an election that 
requires fewer provisional ballots would be ideal, limiting—on Election Day—
access to provisional ballots when a regular ballot is impermissible undermines the 
last line of defense for voters who without access to a provisional ballot would be 
wrongly disenfranchised. 
There is some evidence of poll worker mistake in generally applying the 
standards or guiding voters. Depending on the circumstances seemingly harmless 
error, such as a board rover insisting only black pens are used can cause delay and 
confusion, such as when only blue pens are provided.160 Some errors don’t affect a 
voter’s ballot access on Election Day, but could complicate audits if there is a future 
problem.161 Concerns poll workers share represent broader logistical hurdles, such as 
when a cell phone will not work within a polling location so a poll worker must go 
to the sidewalk to call in an issue.162 One report showed a fundamental 
misunderstanding, at least at first, of the importance of the poll book when a poll 
                                                                                                                                         
regular ballot who should have voted provisionally, attempts to call the Board for resolution 
were made but it was difficult to get through). Copies maintained by the author. 
 158 See, e.g., LID #2114 Problems and Correction Section O-Z, 1 from Franklin County 
(Nov. 6, 2012) “BOE mistyped first name ‘Mark’ and ‘Mary’—voted as regular voter on 
machine—please correct name showed voter card from BOE with ‘Mary’ + proper ID with 
Mark & correct address.”); cf. Notes from Hamilton County, Precinct Cincinnati 5-G (Nov. 6, 
2012) (“[V]oter name is misspelled (one letter typo) voted provisionally because name in 
wrong alphabetical location was not seen.” In the same precinct a voter on the supplemental 
list voted provisionally.). Copies maintained by the author. 
 159 Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #37 from Cuyahoga County, Beachwood 
Ward 00 Precinct G (Nov. 6, 2012). A voter with a different last name from the poll book 
voted a regular ballot by showing a marriage license with the changed name. In the same 
precinct, a voter who was not in the poll book, but was on the lists of names and addresses that 
are periodically posted was permitted to vote a regular ballot. This precinct took a very voter-
oriented approach that used available information and not a strict adherence to procedure in 
determining whether a voter should have a provisional or regular ballot. A copy is maintained 
by the author. 
 160 Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #51 from Cuyahoga County, Bedford 02B 
(Nov. 6, 2012) (Blue or black ink can be read by the optical scanning equipment.). A copy is 
maintained by the author. 
 161 See Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #13J from Cuyahoga County (Nov. 6, 
2012) (“five ballot numbers forgetting to be written down”); Election Day Precinct Incident 
Log Record #1507 from Cuyahoga County, North Olmstead 03 G (Nov. 6, 2012) (“We were 
so busy—stub numbers before 60 were not recorded, 1 person short at our table.”); see also 
LID #1211 from Franklin County, Precinct Workbook Zone #1 Columbus Firehouse Number 
Thirty One (Nov. 6, 2012) (“the morning balancing was difficult due to failure to maintain 
separate tally and mixing of old and new authority to vote slips, high volume of voters 
contributed.”). Copies maintained by the author. 
 162 Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record # 349 from Cuyahoga County, Cleveland 
03S (Nov. 6, 2012). A copy is maintained by the author. 
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worker had two voters who were not in the book just sign at the bottom of the page 
before being corrected by another worker.163 Some reports reflect trouble with 
interaction between poll workers,164 which would certainly hinder the Election Day 
process and reduce voter confidence. These items, in addition to the poll workers’ 
actions regarding ballot handling and provisional processing reflect the complex job 
facing precinct level election administrators especially given frequent election law 
changes, long hours, and the inexperience of workers and voters. 
Finally, though not as common as some other themes, the reports do reflect errors 
by voters of varying degrees of severity. This can be as simple as a voter signing on 
the wrong line165 to as severe as someone who has moved providing and voting as if 
they still lived at the prior address.166 Some reports show voters who escalate conflict 
with poll workers for a perceived or actual problem.167 These mistakes by voters add 
to potential post-election verification problems and increase the administrative 
burden on poll workers. Further, open conflicts between voters and poll workers 
hinder the voting process and reduce confidence for everyone.  
                                                                                                                                         
 163 Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Erie County, Pert #4 (Nov. 6, 2012). A copy is 
maintained by the author. 
 164 Notes from Hamilton County, Cincinnati, Delhi B (November 6, 2012) (Reflects 
repeated attempts to contact the Board of Elections and a concern that the presiding judge was 
over-reliant on the Board given the long wait times. The presiding judge is reported to have 
said in response to this concern, “I worked the polls for 30 years and I am calling the BOE.”); 
Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Hamilton County, Cincinnati 26-E (Nov. 6, 2012) 
(Included a long narrative regarding conflict between the poll workers including, for example, 
one poll worker misapplying the identification standard. The presiding judge referred to 
general chaos and “getting cursed out at least 3 times.”). Copies are maintained by the author. 
 165 This happens and is reported quite frequently. For example, in a precinct with a linked 
signature and voting system, a woman voted as her husband due to poll worker error, but it 
was subsequently adjusted when the husband voted as his wife. Election Day Precinct Incident 
Log from Richland County, Mad A, McElroy Church of Christ (November 6, 2012) (copy on 
file with author); see also Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #167 from Cuyahoga 
County, Broadview Heights 03 D (Nov. 6, 2012); Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record 
#171 from Cuyahoga County, Broadview Heights 04B (Nov. 6, 2012); LID# 1069 from 
Franklin County, Zone #2 A-K (Nov. 6, 2012). Copies maintained by the author. 
 166 See, e.g., Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Clark County, Mfld-7 Northridge 
UMC (Nov. 6, 2012) (voter voted as registered, but subsequently when his wife came to vote 
it was discovered they had moved and he should have gone to the new precinct). It should be 
noted this type of incident is the type of voter error that some would call “fraud,” but for the 
purposes of this Article unless intent of voter fraud can be discerned from available records 
such actions will be considered mistakes. A copy is maintained by the author. 
 167 See Election Day Precinct Incident Log form Hamilton County, Symmes F (Nov. 6, 
2012) (voter ultimately cast a ballot, but had conflict with poll workers on presenting the 
proper form of ID and not being asked for an alternative). The report reflects the voter was 
told “could not vote.” See also Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Hamilton County, 
Sycamore N (Nov. 6, 2012) (Voter with a registration card was not found in the poll book and 
angrily refused to vote provisionally. Voter left but upon return after a long hold with the 
Board of Elections the voter was found in the supplemental list. The voter loudly demanded 
apologies and was angry throughout the interaction.). In these examples, though the poll 
worker committed error in processing the voter, the action of the voters hindered resolution of 
the issue. Copies are maintained by the author. 
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Through evaluating precinct incident logs a picture emerges of what can happen 
in a precinct on Election Day. These reports highlight the near infinite number of 
variables that are part of any election. They also make clear that ultimately elections 
are run by fallible people whose judgment will inevitably affect the voting rights of 
some of the voters they serve on any given day. Steps should be taken to both 
improve this data and to adapt elections systems to guide poll workers toward voter-
favored decision making. 
III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. Collect and use better data for Election Day functionality168 with a goal of 
creating real time Due Process protection for Election Day concerns. 
As the research and writing for this piece occurred, it became clear little 
scholarly work has focused on Election Day problems themselves because the 
evidence available is piecemeal and too often anecdotal. By focusing on Ohio, we 
were able to create a limited scope that made data collection a still difficult but 
achievable goal. Somewhat ironically, we were also aided by the volume of litigation 
and attention that has been paid to Ohio’s election process. Though the cases169 focus 
on the counting of provisional ballots utilize a fault based framework that this 
research shows could be problematic, the evidence collected is incredibly valuable in 
understanding Election Day functionality. 
This conclusion is also reflected in “The American Voting Experience: Report 
and Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration” 
January 2014.170 The report focuses a great deal on the need for better planning, 
preparation, and use of customer services and engineering practices in managing 
elections. The report does reflect that part of why Election Day itself cannot be better 
managed is due to a lack of data. “Despite the fact that elections drown in data, and 
political campaigns have transformed American politics by gathering and analyzing 
data about their supporters, election administration has largely escaped this data 
revolution.”171 In its recommendation the Commission advised collection and 
reporting of “transaction data” in order to improve the “voter experience.”172 This 
Article’s examination of available information even at a transactional level supports 
this conclusion. 
It is therefore critical to find a mechanism to better capture both the perceived 
and actual functioning of polling places on Election Day. The work of groups like 
                                                                                                                                         
 168 For the purpose of this Article, Election Day functionality would reflect the highest 
percentage of voters being efficiently and correctly processed in a manner that allows for 
after-the-fact verification that decisions on regular versus provisional ballots and counting 
versus rejecting those provisional ballots was correct. 
 169 NEOCH v. Husted, No. 12-4354, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26926 (6th Cir. Nov. 16, 
2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca6-12-04354; SEIU v. 
Husted, 698 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 170 PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION 
ADMINISTRATION 68 (Jan. 2014), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2014/01/ 
Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf.  
 171 Id. 
 172 Id.  
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Election Protection and calls staffed by governmental and non-governmental entities 
is valuable but is too small scale and lacks routine follow up and analysis. In 
addition, reliance on call center data too heavily will skew any result towards areas 
or issues where people report problems while unfairly ignoring the many precincts 
and elections where there are minimal if any concerns or reports. On the other hand, 
in order for a problem to be reported someone—an observer, a voter, or a poll 
worker—must recognize it as a problem. The call logs reveal a lack of understanding 
of what is or is not permitted in Ohio law. A voter who fails to properly sign a 
provisional ballot will be unknowingly disenfranchised. In contrast, complaints of 
rejection of the use of a passport as identification misunderstand that a passport is 
not considered proper identification under Ohio law. 
The volume of reports and the increased awareness of the potential for Election 
Day problems could and should be harnessed to improve both the actual and 
perceived functioning of elections. Poll workers should be encouraged to discuss any 
concern with voters. The incident reports include notations of voters who left 
without casting a provisional ballot who could have become frustrated with the 
process. Voters who become angry with poll workers could also be aided by a more 
open dialogue process. This combined with the high number of calls to the Secretary 
of State and Election Protection officials reflect an increasingly engaged yet wary 
voter mentality. If voters understand why something has been done it will improve 
their confidence in the outcome. Simultaneously, precinct officials who explain and 
discuss their actions will deepen their own understanding of the requirements 
allowing for goal oriented rather than technocratic application of Election Day 
procedures. Voters should be empowered to ask necessary questions and have a 
mechanism to report both what works and what doesn’t work about their election 
experience. 
Too much of our understanding of what might go wrong at a polling place on 
Election Day stems from litigation where review of the facts occurs only in a highly 
charged and adversarial process. It is impossible to remedy wrongs when there is 
limited unbiased data to improve a complex electoral system. The goal of such 
improvement would be to minimize any unnecessary provisional ballots and ensure 
that Election Day error does not result in actual disenfranchisement, perceived 
disenfranchisement, or a lack of confidence in the election result.173 This could 
ultimately narrow the litigation margin and reduce the reliance on litigation to adjust 
electoral standards. 
B. Ohio should manage elections and related disputes through legislative adoption 
of policies incorporating the materiality principle and the Democracy Canon. 
The Ohio General Assembly, as with other state legislative bodies, is in a unique 
position to bring alive a principled approach to mistake and ambiguity in ways that 
would facilitate elections and minimize the need for continuous administrative and 
judicial interpretations of election laws. The 2012 election and the litigation that has 
                                                                                                                                         
 173 Reducing the number of unnecessary provisional ballots should not be achieved by 
limiting provisional ballot access for voters who are unable to cast a regular ballot—any such 
attempt undermines the very purpose of provisional ballots. Counties that had a call-in policy 
for provisional ballot access should reevaluate such requirements as it was a drain on 
resources and negates the opportunity for the post-election analysis provisional ballots were 
intended to allow. 
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been continuing in Ohio for years highlight the impossibility of creating an election 
system sufficiently detailed to avoid any gaps. However, inclusion in election code 
at a state level language like the materiality protection in the Civil Rights Act and a 
catchall standard that ambiguities should be decided in favor of voters will anticipate 
and guide unexpected election concerns. Existing statutes and standards should be 
evaluated and reformed in response to existing federal law on materiality and the 
need for a guiding principle. 
By necessity, all election systems will rely upon the actions of millions of 
individuals for the offering, casting, collection, and counting of ballots. As is 
reflected in the pleadings, public data, and hotline reports, the potential for mistakes 
to be made by voters or election officials operating in good faith with the best of 
intentions are inevitable. Thankfully, the Anderson/Burdick standard does not require 
overly technical or rigid responses to such errors, but looks to balance the reality of 
election regulation against the experience of human operators.174 Though designed 
for analysis of election schemes in a litigation framework both the materiality 
principle and Democracy Canon can provide guidance for needed flexibility to 
promote rather than endanger fairness and electoral confidence. 
The Materiality Principle and the Democracy Canon should be immediately 
incorporated into judicial analysis of election disputes in Ohio. The Ohio General 
Assembly needs to include these analytical approaches as bedrock principles by 
enacting the Anderson/Burdick balancing standard in statutory regulation of 
elections. This should include, at minimum, instruction to consider errors based on 
whether or not they matter rather than through a fault-based analysis that has so 
often been used in Ohio.175 This could be especially beneficial in provisional 
balloting standards: if it was part of the record why a provisional ballot was offered, 
it could be determined that a voter should have had a regular ballot at which point 
any analysis should cease and the vote should be counted. This type of evaluation 
better balances the rights and obligations of provisional voters against those who 
perhaps should have been provisional voters but erroneously cast a regular ballot. 
This standard should be taught and emphasized at every level of election 
administration to facilitate the goal of counting ballots in contrast to the current 
overly process-oriented election procedures. 
The materiality principle is at its core a reasonableness doctrine, applying a 
reasonable person standard to election discrepancies. This can be the beginning, but 
cannot be the end, of guidance for voters and election officials, as there still needs to 
be a guiding principle over areas where reasonable minds could differ. That principle 
can and should be taken from the Democracy Canon: ambiguities should be decided 
in favor of the voter. If this balanced standard was then embraced by legislative 
entities, it could serve as a safety net within existing election regulation—a guided 
reasonableness requirement for when human error or unforeseen circumstances 
require the exercise of judgment on Election Day.  
Through such a process the need for pre- and post-election litigation could be 
minimized, but even when required such litigation would have stronger backing in 
the representative process. Ohio could and should legislatively create a pre-
                                                                                                                                         
 174 See supra notes 53-61. 
 175 See generally NEOCH v. Husted, No. 12-4354, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26926 (6th Cir. 
Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca6-12-04354; SEIU 
v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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determined standard for how to balance the competing interests of voters and the 
state. Such a standard recognizing the role of mistake and requiring ambiguities be 
decided in favor of voters would guide election officials, from the Secretary of State 
down to each poll worker, and as needed guide judges to decide election disputes on 
principles from within rather than beyond Ohio law. 
C. The Election Assistance Commission and federal support for election review and 
analysis are strongly recommended. 
The need for better data collection and analysis cannot be met without federal 
support both on a policy and monetary level. The Federal Elections Assistance 
Commission, which is currently without any commissioners,176 was established as a 
clearinghouse for information and best practices. As states pursue divergent 
solutions to evolving electoral systems challenges, an ability to comparatively 
evaluate their experiences is needed for continued improvement in election systems. 
Further, the EAC could evaluate and certify voting equipment to the states which 
would free up additional state resources.177 
There also needs to be federal support for maintenance of voting machines under 
requirements enacted as part of the Help America Vote Act. Even if Ohio wished to 
invest in better poll worker training and data collection, it would be difficult to do so 
given the financial burden aging voting machines place on state and local 
resources.178 Since current voting machines were purchased for use at the same time 
to meet federal requirements, Ohio, along with other states faces a significant 
financial burden to repair and replace the equipment which is all aging out at the 
same time. 
At both a state and federal level an investment is needed, not just in the physical 
mechanics of voting, but in pursuing an understanding of what is and is not working 
in modern election systems. This is especially true of an understanding of the events 
of Election Day at a polling place level where systematic study has not occurred. If 
fully functional, the EAC could recommend best practices for Election Day 
monitoring and evaluation from which to build future investment. Significant data 
collection and investment in analysis of that data is necessary to develop a 
quantitative and statistically significant understanding of the Election Day 
experience of voters and election officials alike. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Analyzing the administration of the 2012 General Election in Ohio with the 
background of other recent elections shows that both luck and margins of victory 
were as responsible as election administration for avoidance of electoral meltdown. 
                                                                                                                                         
 176 The commission is not entirely defunct, though it lacks commissioners. See 
Commissioners, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, http://www.eac.gov/about_the_eac/ 
commissioners.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2014). It still maintains some staff that continue the 
mission of the EAC as authorized. See Dan Tokaji, The EAC Marches On, ELECTION LAW 
BLOG, http://electionlawblog.org/?p=54056 (Aug. 7, 2013).  
 177 The Presidential Commission reached similar conclusions. PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON 
ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 64-65 (Jan. 2014). 
 178 Id. at 62-63; see also Barry M. Horstman, Husted Makes Case for Funding Ohio Voting 
Machines, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, (Dec. 11, 2012). 
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As a state, Ohio is woefully unprepared for increased scrutiny of its practices, 
particularly within the context of a judicial intervention in an election. Ohio has 
ignored the existence of simple human error when crafting its laws and standards.  
The most straightforward requirement is the need to collect better information of 
what happens on Election Day. Through examining litigation documents and public 
records, it is evident that record keeping is deficient, at best. From the individual poll 
worker through to the Secretary of State, records collection and retention must be 
improved. In order to truly understand and address systemic problems, better data is 
needed to quantify the experience of voters and election officials.  
The laws of the state of Ohio must recognize that perfection is impossible in 
elections administration and error exists without malicious intent. A principled 
approach to election administration where ambiguity should be resolved for the voter 
can fill gaps in the law as it is impossible to legislate every aspect of the millions of 
individual actions which go in to each election. Voter error is not voter fraud, poll 
worker error is not intended to be voter suppression, but both can have such effects 
when election officials are not empowered to use common sense in furtherance and 
protection of the most fundamental right to vote.  
In any system within which humans interact, there will always be a degree of 
error. Currently, the only effective remediation is pre- and post-election litigation. 
This is unacceptable.  
By implementing a system that only invalidates ballots for material error, that 
accepts substantial or constructive compliance of completed ballots and uses the 
Democracy Canon to guide pre- and post-election litigation and administrative 
remedies, we would create a system that is far superior to current law, respects each 
voter’s intention, and reveres each individual vote. Perfection is not an option for 
election administration, but common sense reforms and voter-oriented principles can 
make Election Day perfectly reasonable and most importantly, fair. 
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